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The separation of powers is a staple of liberty and American 
republicanism, and “the primary organizational principle” of the United States 
Constitution.
1
  At the time of the ratification debate, Federalists and 
Antifederalists quarreled over the proper application of this framework 
to American society.  For the Federalists, the three most significant voices were 
arguably two authors of The Federalist, James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton, and James Wilson, the leader of the debate in Pennsylvania and 
one of the most active delegates of the Convention.  While they disagreed 
profusely on many areas of governance, all three subscribed to a common, 
unifying notion: a stronger national government can be formed without 
threatening liberty.
2
  All three thinkers also accepted the idea of the sovereignty 
of the people as a basis for abandoning the Articles of Confederation and 
forming a new government.
3
  The Antifederalist side, however, thought that 
the Constitution was deficient in part because it failed to truly realize the 
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 1  JOHN A. ROHR, FOUNDING REPUBLICS IN FRANCE AND AMERICA: A STUDY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 189 (1995). 
 2 JAMES H. READ, POWER VERSUS LIBERTY: MADISON, HAMILTON, WILSON, AND JEFFERSON 18 
(2000). 
 3 Id. (discussing how Alexander Hamilton’s perceptions of popular sovereignty were similar but more 
attenuated than that of James Wilson).  Wilson’s political philosophy, to a large extent, orbited 
around this concept of sovereignty.  While modern understanding of Hamiltonian thought suggests 
that the idea of sovereignty was more of a legitimizing principle than anything else, Wilson saw it as 
much more.  See id. at 90 (noting while both Hamilton and Wilson were strong nationalists, Wilson 
was more democratic, as he deemed the people to be superior to both the state and federal 
government). 
 4 See, e.g., Letter from Rev. James Madison to James Madison (Oct. 1, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS 
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 49 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE 
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The principle of the separation of powers predates the ratification of the 
Constitution in American political thought.  Even before the 1787 
Convention, the separation of powers was crucial to the formation of state 
governments in Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina.
5
  Article VI of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, for example, provided “[t]hat the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to be forever 
separate and distinct from each other.”
6
  The principle was also a common 
tool for pointing out the defects of the Articles of Confederation.  In 1783, for 
instance, Alexander Hamilton, in drafting a resolution calling for a convention 
to amend the Articles of Confederation, referred to the governing document–
–particularly the broad authority granted to the unicameral legislature by the 
Articles––as “contrary to the most approved and well founded maxims of free 
government which require that the legislative executive and judicial authorities 
should be deposited in distinct and separate hands.”
7
 
Unlike the Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina constitutions, the 
Federal Constitution of 1787 did not explicitly enshrine the separation of 
powers principle.
8
  Rather, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches as 
we understand them today were separated as a functional result of the manner 
in which the different powers were delegated by the Framers.  While the 
application of separation of powers is clear from the Constitution, the 
governing document itself does not provide clear guidance on the convention 
delegates’ understanding of the doctrine in theory. 
This Article explores the separation of powers principle as understood by 
different sides and players of the debate.  The mainstream positions of the 
Federalists and Antifederalists are of course the most obvious schism in 
viewpoint.  This Article will survey the differing treatments of the principle of 
separation of powers in The Federalist and by key opponents of the 
 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION] (advising that the “[l]egislative [and] executive [d]epartments 
should be entirely distinct [and] independent”) (emphasis added). 
 5 Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American 
Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) 
(referencing the founding documents of these three states to argue that the separation of powers 
principle does not require the three branches to be completely separate from one another). 
 6 MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VI; see also VA. CONST. of 1776 (“The legislative, 
executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers 
properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of [more] than one of them, 
at the same time . . . .”). 
 7 Alexander Hamilton, Continental Congress Unsubmitted Resolution Calling for a Convention to 
Amend the Articles of Confederation, [July 1783], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0272. 
 8  See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (explaining the functions of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches). 
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Constitution.  The concepts of separation and checks have inherent tension 
with one another: while Federalists tended to err on the side of more 
overlapping powers in the form of checks, Antifederalists wanted a 
much greater degree of separation between the departments.
9
  But there are 
notable differences in political thought between the most prominent 
defenders of the Constitution as well.  James Wilson is one of the most 
overlooked Framers, yet he was one of the most impactful voices at the 
1787 Convention and during the subsequent ratification debate.
10
  In an 
attempt to rectify this disservice, this Article will also compare Wilson’s 
philosophical justification for and application of separation of powers with that 
of The Federalist and the Antifederalist ideology.  In so doing, it is apparent 
that his stances land at different points along the spectrum of the debate.  
While Wilson advocated for greater checks (and therefore less separation) 
between the branches in some senses, he also believed that some elements of 
governance were not separate enough under the 1787 Constitution.  
Wilson’s interpretation of separation of powers exemplifies that, although 
fundamental in American political thought, the maxim was a point of 
contention both between the opposing sides of the ratification debate and 




The principle of separation of powers, as it is understood in American 
governance,
 
was handed down by Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La 
Brède et de Montesquieu.
12
  A French philosopher and political writer, 
 
9  See, e.g., Bryan, infra note 58 (warning that the mixture of legislative and executive powers in a single 
would create political corruption). 
 10 See MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON, 1742–
1798, at 1 (1997) (introducing Wilson as “perhaps the most underrated founder”). 
 11 See, e.g., Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1652  (2020) 
(determining that the Appointments Clause, and therefore executive authority, does not govern the 
appointment of members to the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico); 
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 911 (2018)  (holding that the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation 
Act does not violate separation of powers); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) 
(holding that sentencing guidelines are not a violation of the separation of powers  principle); Miller 
v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 348–49 (2000) (holding that the automatic stay of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act does not violate separation of powers principles); Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor,  478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (“When these Article III limitations [such as separation 
of powers] are at issue, notions of  consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations 
serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.”). 
 12 Montesquieu was not the first to articulate or endorse the separation of powers idea.  Locke, for 
example, had also written in favor of separate executive and legislative powers.  See Samuel W. 
Cooper, Note, Considering “Power” in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361, 363 (1994) 
(highlighting Locke’s observation that “‘well-ordered common-wealths’ separated legislative and 
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Montesquieu inspired the fundamental notions of government that gave birth 
to the structure of American republicanism.  The idea that government should 
be decentralized among three sources of authority is one of the most 
celebrated principles today and during the time of the Founding.  Advocates 
on both sides of the Constitution admired and cited Montesquieu regularly to 
support their conclusions.  During the American Founding and beyond, many 
regarded his contribution to Enlightenment thought as the “greatest 
achievement of modern political philosophy.”
13
 
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws introduced the idea of classifying 
government into distinct categories of power, namely the executive, judicial, 
and legislative powers.  In  Montesquieu’s view, this separation is crucial to the 
preservation of liberty, which requires that  “government be [structured such] 
that one man need not be afraid of another.”
14
  If the legislative  and executive 
powers were combined under a single authority, for instance, there can be no 
liberty because that entity can “enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a 
tyrannical manner.”
15
  Similarly, if the legislative and judicial powers were 
combined, then the people’s liberty “would be exposed to arbitrary control,” 
and if the judicial power joined with that of the executive, then a “judge 
might  behave with violence and oppression.”
16
  In other words, a free society 
cannot exist where a “single  institution could exert all [of the] power.”
17  
It 





executive powers to assure that those who make the laws also remain subject to them”) (citing JOHN 
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 134–58 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690)).  
Montesquieu was, however, the first to emphasize the importance of an independent judiciary, which 
would later evolve into the spirit of Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 78 and the idea of judicial review.  
See Bergman, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that Montesquieu “popularized the trinity between the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government”).  Nevertheless, among the strongest 
voices during the ratification period, Montesquieu was the most often cited political authority on this 
issue.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (highlighting Montesquieu); see also 
GEORGE THOMAS, THE MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION 18 (2008) (referring to Montesquieu as “the 
most cited authority in The Federalist”). 
 13 Michael P. Zuckert, The Political Science of James Madison, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 153 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga eds., 2003). 
 14 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 182 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent 
trans., 1900) (1748). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of the Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 375 (1976). 
 18 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 183. 
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During the ratification debate, Federalists and Antifederalists alike found 
inspiration in Montesquieu’s writings.
19
  Both saw their visions of government 
as consistent with his principles.  Because of their differing views on the 
meaning and proper application of republicanism, they used Montesquieu’s 
arguments as a premise for different conclusions.  Utilizing 
Montesquieu’s  republican ideology, for example, Antifederalists argued that 




Montesquieu wrote that, among other circumstances, “[t]he  principle of 
democracy is corrupted . . . when the spirit of equality is extinct.”
21
  Many 
Antifederalists maintained that by empowering the elite few at the expense of 
the masses, the Constitution would corrupt republican virtue in America.
22
  
While the Antifederalists utilized Montesquieu’s republican ideology to a 
greater degree than the Federalists, both sides relied on his principle of 
separation of powers in framing the debate.  Federalists and Antifederalists 
alike agreed almost universally that all of the government’s power ought not 
be concentrated in a single department or institution.
23
  The Federalists 
contended that this virtue was necessary for an orderly republic and that the 
Constitution satisfied this demand.
24
  But the Antifederalists maintained that 
the proposed government failed to put the principle into proper practice and, 
therefore, fostered a corrupt and dysfunctional republic that would 
eventually  spiral into tyranny or aristocracy.  Of course, this logically leads to 
the conclusion that the Federalists and Antifederalists harbored different 
notions of what effective separation of powers entailed.  It is apparent from 
the arguments that the Antifederalists interpreted The Spirit of the Laws as 
 
 19 See Abraham Kupersmith, Montesquieu and the Ideological Strain in Antifederalist Thought, in 
THE FEDERALISTS, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 47 
(Wilson Carey McWilliams & Michael T. Gibbons eds., 1992) (exploring the influence of 
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws on Antifederalist thought). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 
(James Madison) (referring to Montesquieu as “[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on 
th[e] subject [of comingling governmental powers]”).  
 20  Id. at 58; see also MELANCTON SMITH, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 388 (Kenyon ed., 1985) (1788). 
 21 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 133. 
 22 See, e.g., THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel) (arguing that the Senate would serve as an 
“aristocratic junto” of which the president would be head); Brutus, Excerpts from Brutus No. 1, 
Annotated (Oct. 18, 1787), BILL OF RTS. INST., https://docs-of-
freedom.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/document/attachment/440/Brutus_No_1_Excerpts_Annotate
d_Proof_3__1_.pdf (quoting THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS to argue that “[i]t is natural to a republic to 
have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist”).  
 23 Referring to the principle of separation of powers, the first paragraph of The Federalist No. 47 opens 
by stating that “[n]o political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 
(James Madison). 
 24 See id.  
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requiring a narrower definition of “separate” and “distinct.”  But The 
Federalist understood it quite differently. 
I. THE FEDERALIST 
The Federalist, one of the most significant writings in American political 
history, is one of the most relied upon texts when it comes to constitutional 
interpretation.  The U.S. Supreme Court affords deference to the essays 
regularly in its opinions.
25
  This explains, in part, the reverence of the 
separation of powers principle in relation to American system of government.  
When it comes to studying the separation of powers and the role it was meant 




One of the primary critiques of the proposed Constitution was that the 
three branches of government were not separate enough.
27
  Publius, the pen 
name used by the authors of The Federalist, devoted a significant portion of 
the essays to rebutting this proposition.  In The Federalist, Madison wrote that 
“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the 
same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
28
  He 
attributed this principle to “the celebrated Montesquieu,” “[t]he oracle who is 
 
 25 See Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion 
Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RSCH. Q. 329, 329 (“Over the past several 
decades many on the Supreme Court have increasingly cited the Federalist Papers in majority, 
concurring and dissenting opinions.”). 
 26 The reasoning in The Federalist should not necessarily be conflated with Madison and Hamilton’s 
preferences for ideal forms of government in all cases.  See Zuckert, supra note 13, at 165 
(maintaining that an overemphasis on The Federalist has “prevented us from grasping the full scope 
or character of the Madisonian political science”).  The final product was the result of a multitude of 
compromises.  No delegate agreed with every aspect of the governing document when the 
Convention adjourned in September 1787.  Madison’s notes from the Federal Convention reveal 
stark differences between what The Federalist authors said behind closed doors and what they 
presented for the public’s consideration.  For example, on June 4, 1787, Hamilton endorsed 
empowering the President with an absolute negative on legislation.  See JAMES MADISON, THE 
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 51–52 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920).  However, 
in The Federalist No. 73, he praised the virtues of a qualified negative (veto power with the possibility 
of override from the Legislature) while warning about the deficiencies of an absolute one.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 27 See Hamilton, supra note 7 (arguing that the Articles of Confederation was contrary to the separation 
of powers principle). 
 28 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  Madison was writing genuinely when extolling the 
virtues of Montesquieu’s principle.  On June 17, 1787, at the Convention, he also commented that 
the three separate and distinct departments as essential to the preservation of liberty.  MADISON, 
supra note 26, at 112. 
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always consulted and cited on this subject.”
29
  However, he rejected the 
notion that the powers must be separate and distinct in an absolute sense in 
order for liberty to be properly safeguarded.
30
  In citing Montesquieu, Madison 
referred to his discussion of the British Constitution.  He contended that 
Montesquieu viewed the English government as “the mirror of political 
liberty,” as he considered it to be the epitome of the separation of powers 
principle in operation.
31
  Madison  explained that the British Constitution does 
not treat the legislative, executive, and judicial  functions as totally separate 
from one another.
32
  Indeed, among other examples, the monarch has the 
power to enact legislative acts in the form of treaties with other sovereign 
nations, and he can  both appoint and remove judges in certain 
circumstances.
33
  On this basis, Madison concluded that the preservation of 
liberty, as understood by Montesquieu, did not prohibit one individual or 
body from exercising a part of the powers of different governmental functions, 
but rather prohibited one from wielding the entirety of multiple departments.
34
 
The Federalist ideology contended that the separation of powers principle 
in its purest form is not only unnecessary as reasoned by Montesquieu, but 
also harmful to the overall objective of effective and safe governance.
35
  
Because “power is of an encroaching nature,” a “mere  demarcation on 
parchment,” or constitutionally mandated limits, is not enough alone to 
control  passions of human nature and prevent power from concentrating in a 
single individual or body.
36
  Instead, the powers of the branches must overlap 
to a certain degree in order to prevent abuses of  power from the different 
departments, particularly from the legislature.
37
  Accordingly, in Federalist 
 
 29 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
30  Id.  
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[P]artial intermixture [of the executive, 
legislative, and judiciary powers] is even, in some cases, not only proper but necessary to the mutual 
defense of the several members of the government against each other.”). 
 36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). 
 37 In The Federalist No. 48, Madison explains that the legislature is the most prone to overstepping its 
authority under the Constitution because it is “less susceptible of precise limits” and “it can, with the 
greater facility, mask . . . the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.”  See 
also 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 190 (arguing that the executive should be able to restrain 
the legislature but the legislature  should not be able to stay the executive because “the execution has 
its natural limits” and “it is useless to confine it”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264–265 (James 
Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (explaining that predomination of the legislative 
authority  necessitates dividing Congress into two separate branches with differing functions and 
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Nos. 47 and 48, Madison approaches the argument for quasi separate and 
distinct branches of government in two lights.  First, he legitimizes the principle 





And second, he defends its practicality and necessity by pointing 
out the dangers that manifest when the safeguards for separate powers merely 
consist of an express provision in the Constitution that forbids the intermixing 
of the three governments, as we saw with Virginia’s constitution prior to 
ratification.
39
  A middle ground  between separate and distinct departments in 
its truest sense and the administration of multiple departments by one 
individual or body, therefore, was the most effective means of preserving 
liberty according to The Federalist.40 
For Publius, overlapping powers among the different departments of 
government was vital for ensuring that each one is able to maintain “a will of 
its own,” thereby preventing government tyranny.
41
  The discussion in 
Federalist Nos. 47 and 48 lays the groundwork for Madison’s conception of 
checks and balances, as elaborated upon in Federalist No. 51.  The 
Federalist’s conception of separate yet partially mixed powers carries over to 
other elements of the Constitution discussed in the essays.  In addressing the 
judiciary, for instance, Hamilton emphasized the need not only for 
independent courts, but also for the courts to be able to void legislative acts 
that defy the Constitution.
42
  The separation of powers principle thus played a 
crucial role for a number of important aspects of the Federalist pitch.  
 
modes of elections); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(acknowledging “[t]he propensity of the legislative department to  intrude upon the rights, and to 
absorb the powers, of the other departments”). 
 38 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (leaning on Montesquieu’s writings to support his conception 
separation of powers). 
 39 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (arguing that the three branches must not be completely siloed). 
 40 Madison’s interpretation of Montesquieu’s separation of powers principle in Federalist No. 48 seems 
to be supported by the text.  In The Spirit of the Laws 189, Montesquieu explains that “[w]ere the 
executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter 
would become despotic; for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased, it would soon 
destroy all the other powers.”  1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14 at 189.  This would suggest that 
Montesquieu intended for overlap between the departments, possibly to a greater extent than the 
Antifederalists would have liked.  Even though Federalist No. 48 does not directly mention 
Montesquieu or address his work, it is likely that Madison’s apparent distrust of the legislature 
compared to the other branches, at least in part, was inspired by The Spirit of the Laws. 
 41 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 42 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the judiciary and judicial review in 
the Constitution).  Although Montesquieu does not address judicial review, it can be inferred that it 
was inspired, at least in part, by The Spirit of the Laws, as it is an inevitable consequence of the 
separation of powers principle.  Indeed, if there is no remedy for unconstitutional acts then the 
system of checks and balances collapses.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
(establishing judicial review). 
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II. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS’ OPPOSITION 
The structure of the United States government is designed by the infusion 
of two key principles: separation of powers and checks and balances.
44
  In 
explaining how these concepts interact with one another, Edward Millican 
observed that these hallmarks, though fundamental, are often quite 
contradictory in practice.
45
  While separation of powers, as understood by The 
Spirit  of the Laws, the Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, and the 
Virginia Constitution of 1776 require that the three branches operate under 
“separate” and “distinct” spheres (strongly implying that they  not “be 




the theory of checks 
and balances  mandates tension and overlapping powers in order to prevent 
governmental institutions from  overreaching in violation of the Constitution.  
This overlap creates a system of government  whereby “institutions that are for 
the most part functionally separate may be given a degree of  control over the 
ordinary duties of the others.”
47
  Federalists and Antifederalists generally 
agreed “that  the members of each department should be as little dependent 
as possible on those of the others,  for the emoluments annexed to their 
offices.”
48
  It appears, however, the split between the  Federalists and 
Antifederalists on the issue of separation of powers, to a large extent, is the 
result  of disagreement on the degree of independence that could be 
reconciled with durable self-government. 
In defending the constitutional system of checks and balances, Hamilton 
argued that the “partial intermixture” of the three branches is, in some cases, 
“necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the government 
against each other.”
49
  The Antifederalists, however, believed that this mixture 
went too far.  While The Federalist maintained that the mixture prescribed by 
the Constitution facilitated “control [of] the abuses of government,”
50 
 
 43 See 1 WILSON, infra note 117, at 260 (“[T]he powers of the several parts of [the] government are 
not kept as distinct and independent as they ought to be.”). 
 44 EDWARD MILLICAN, ONE UNITED PEOPLE: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NATIONAL IDEA 
148 (1990). 
 45 Id. at 149. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 49 THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 50 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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Antifederalists argued that it provided certain institutions too much power 
among multiple disciplines.
51
 In other words, they perceived certain mixture 
of powers, intended to check the branches, as enabling the 
improper accumulation of power by a single body. 
Like Montesquieu, the Antifederalists were very suspicious of corruption 
and greed.
52  
As discussed above, Federalist No. 47 defended the allocation of 
constitutional powers by pointing out that Montesquieu viewed the British 
Constitution as the ideal form of government for the preservation of liberty.  
Although The Federalist by no means advocated for a replication of 
the English system, the fear of a shift towards overreaching government can be 
understood given the fact that the British government consisted of an 




The Antifederalists insisted that the proposed Constitution did not adhere 
strictly enough to Montesquieu’s vision of separate powers.
54
  Indeed, contrary 
to Federalist Nos. 47 and 48, those that opposed ratification commonly and 
strenuously demanded that the separation of the different departments be of 
a much greater degree.  Less than a month after the 1787 Convention 
adjourned, Reverend James Madison wrote to Convention Delegate James 
Madison that the “[l]egislative [and] executive [d]epartments should be 
entirely distinct [and] independent,” warning that proposed distribution of 
power would “threaten [d]estruction to [the] Liberties of 
America.”
55
  However, not every Antifederalist felt that the branches ought to 
be totally separated.  In his sixteenth essay, Brutus, the pen name of a vocal 
Antifederalist, argued that separate and distinct branches in the literal sense 
were not feasible.  He wrote that, “in some special cases,” it was permissible 
to delegate certain executive powers to the legislature.
56
  But with that said, the 
 
 51 See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel) (criticizing the proposed Senate as overpowered). 
 52 See RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 76 (1993) (pointing out the Antifederalist concern about government officials acting 
without sufficient restraint). 
 53 Zuckert, supra note 13, at 155.  Putting this trepidation into the context of the time is important 
too, as the Revolution against the abuses of the British government had been in recent memory. 
 54 See Bryan, infra note 58 (warning that the mixture of legislative and executive powers in a single 
would produce corruption). 
 55 Letter from Rev. James Madison to James Madison (Oct. 1, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 48, 49 (emphasis added). See also Letter from Joseph Spencer to 
James Madison, Enclosing John Leland’s Objections (Feb. 28, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 267, 269 (expressing the same concern). 
 56 Brutus, Brutus XVI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: AN ABRIDGEMENT, BY MURRAY DRY, OF THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 103, 191 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985). 
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separation of the departmental powers “should be sought as far as is 
practicable.”
57
  So while there was some disconformity within the 
Antifederalist  movement regarding the degree of separation that was 
appropriate to maintain liberty, there was near universal consensus that the 
Federal Constitution had defied Montesquieu’s maxim via over mixing of 
powers between branches. 
Specifically, Antifederalists feared the broad powers afforded to the 
proposed Senate by Article I.  The opponents of the new government 
vigorously denounced the Senate, fearing that it  would serve as an “aristocratic 
junto” by conspiring with the President at the expense of the  people’s liberty 
and sovereignty.
58
  Many Antifederalists claimed that by being afforded 
executive  powers over treaties and judicial power to convict impeached 
officers, the Senate exercised all  three powers of government, thereby 
violating the principle of separation of powers.
59
  Writing  under the 
pseudonym “A Columbian Patriot,” Mercy Otis Warren expressed alarm 
about this  mixture, particularly between the legislative and executive 
departments.
60
  He believed that the powers delegated by the Constitution were 
“couched in such ambiguous terms—in such vague and  ind[e]finite 
expression.”
61
  This can arguably be taken to be a critique of the Federal 
Constitution affording too much discretion through obscurity. 
Antifederalists warned about the power of the Senate to remove the 
President from office, categorizing it as a judicial power.  Opponents of the 
Constitution alleged that this authority stood in direct contrast to the ability to, 
as described by John Dawson, serve as “council to the President.”
62
  During 
the North Carolina Convention, for instance, Samuel Spencer warned that 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel); ROHR, supra note 1, at 194; see also Samuel Bryan, Reply 
to Wilson’s Speech: “Centinel” II, FREEMAN’S J. (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in in 1 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 77, 86–87 (warning that providing the Senate with “a 
considerable share in the executive as well  as legislative” would turn it into “a permanent 
aristocracy”).  Bryan contended that any sort of mixture between the two departments “highly tends 
to corruption” and advocated for their complete separation.  Id. 
 59 See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel) (referring to the Senate as an “aristocratic junto”); see 
also ROHR, supra note 1, at 194 (referring to the Senate as “a favorite whipping boy of the Anti-
Federalists”). 
 60 “A Columbian Patriot” [Mercy Otis Warren], Observations on the Constitution (Feb. 1788), in 2 
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 284, 290. 
 61 Id. 
 62 John Dawson’s Fears for the Future (June 24, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 4, at 742, 746. 
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the  Senate should not be able to both advise the President
63
 and vote to convict 
him for impeachment  because that would give them the power to remove the 
President for doing precisely what the  Senate approved him to do.
64
  The 
Senate, in this circumstance, would have too much control over  the President, 
thereby allowing it to accumulate too much power at the expense of liberty.  
The power of trying impeachments also allegedly encouraged corruption by 
enabling the Senate to elect not to remove a culpable president in exchange 
for some sort of benefit from the executive branch.
65
  If this is the case, then 
presidents would not be held accountable when executing  “treasonable 
attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people, when instigated by 
his  coadjutors in the senate.”
66
  Because the Constitution’s delegation of 
powers enabled this kind of  corruption, the executive and legislative branches 
were deemed by Antifederalists to be  “dangerously connected.”
67
 
Antifederalists were additionally concerned that the long duration of 
Senate terms and  small number of representatives would make it easier for 
legislators to conspire with one another, potentially leading to significant 
abuses of power.
68
  Specifically, the Constitution’s opponents feared that the 
duration of power and the means of acquiring it intensified the dangers that 
came with affording different governmental functions to the same 
department.
69
  In his letter to Edmund  Randolph, for example, Richard 
Henry Lee pointed out with alarm that merely twenty-seven  individuals, the 
President, and all the Senators, would be carrying out all of the executive 
 
 63 Many Antifederalists considered appointments to be a solely executive power and it was an overreach 
to give Congress a share of that authority.  Instead, the Pennsylvania Antifederalists preferred that a 
small independent council outside of the legislative branch approve presidential appointments with 
a majority vote.  See Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1787), in 1 
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 526, 547 (“[T]he supreme executive powers 
ought to have been placed in the president, with a small independent council, made personally 
responsible for every appointment to office or other act, by having their opinions recorded; and that 
without the concurrence of the majority of the quorum of this council, the president should not be 
capable of taking any step.”). 
 64 Samuel Spencer Objects to the Powers of the Senate and Fears It Will Control the President (July 
28, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 879, 880. 
 65 Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 526, 547. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See “An Officer of the Late Continental Army” [William Findley?], Reply to Wilson’s Speech, 
INDEP. GAZETTEER (Nov. 6, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 4, at 92, 99–100. 
69  See, e.g., id. at 100 (“Congress are to have the power of fixing the time, place, and manner of holding 
elections, so as to keep them forever subjected to their influence.”). 
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power and two-thirds of the legislative power.
70
  He concluded that “either a 
monarchy or aristocracy will  be generated,” as the Constitution was “highly 
and dangerously oligarchic” in form.
71
  Randolph  agreed.  In his letter 
explaining his reasons for not signing the Constitution while serving as a 
delegate at the Convention, he wrote that tyranny is inevitable when “[t]he 
legislative and executive [powers] are concentrated in the same persons.”
72
 
Thus, while The Spirit of the Laws and The Federalist repeatedly warn 
about the danger of overreach by the legislature (preventing this is the primary 
purpose of separation of powers and checks and balances according to 
Publius), Antifederalists viewed the overlapping powers afforded to the Senate 
as engendering the exact outcome meant to be avoided.
73
  The debate  suggests 
that the Federalists and the Antifederalists harbored differing definitions of 
what  constituted an executive and legislative power,
74 
and they differed on the 
extent that the separation  of powers principle should play a role in American 
governance.  The Antifederalists generally wanted the principle applied in the 
 
 70 See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Dec. 6, 1787), in 1 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 465, 465–66 (describing such a combination of 
power as “formidable”); see also Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 
1787) in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 526, 546 (arguing that vesting too 
much authority to so few representatives would encourage corruption by inducing foreign agents to 
bribe government officials, especially with regards to forming  treaties with the nations that the agents 
represent). 
 71 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Dec. 6, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE 
ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 465, 465–66; see also “Cato” V, Can an American Be a 
Tyrant? On the Great Powers of the Presidency, the Vagueness of the Constitution, and the Dangers 
of Congress, N.Y.J. (Nov. 22, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 4, at 399, 402 (“[R]epresentation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of corruption, 
and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments ought to take precautions . . . .”). 
 72 See Governor Edmund Randolph’s Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1 
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 595, 603 (providing Edmund Randolph’s 
letter, dated October 10, 1787, outlining his reasons for refusing to sign the Constitution).  The vice 
presidency, acting as a bridge between the executive and legislative branches, also produced concern 
among Antifederalists for the same reason.  Richard Henry Lee, for instance, argued that the vice 
presidency undermined the separation of powers principle, explaining that if “[t]he vice president 
may be part of the Senate at one period, and act as the supreme executive at another,” then it follows 
that “the president is connected with or tied to the Senate.”  Richard Henry Lee, in ESSENTIAL 
WORKS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 277 (Leonard Kriegel ed., 1964). 
 73 See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (arguing that the President would be a “mere pageant” and 
referring to the Senate as an “aristocratic junto”). 
 74 See e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (explaining that the power of entering into treaties does not fall 
explicitly under the executive or legislative function, as it pertains to contracts with foreign sovereigns 
rather than passing or executing laws intended to regulate the citizenry); see also James Wilson’s 
Summation and Final Rebuttal at the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), 1 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 844 (making the same point regarding treaties made in 
Federalist No. 75). 
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purest and most absolute form that they deemed practical, but the Federalists 
had a broader view of practicality. 
III. JAMES WILSON 
A signer of both the Declaration of Independence and a sitting justice on 
the first Supreme Court of the United States, James Wilson was one of the 
leading voices at the Federal Convention and the lead framer of the 1790 
Pennsylvania Constitution.
75
  He was well-versed in Montesquieu’s writings 
and was a long-time defender of the separation of powers principle.  As far 
back as 1774, Wilson strenuously contended that when a single authority is 
vested with all governing power, “liberty, like a structure of ice, would instantly 




In Wilson’s view, 
even in democratically elected governments, humans “may err” and  “may 
deviate from their duty,” making it necessary to counteract that with separate 
institutions of  power.
77
  He attributed the abuse of the American colonies in 
part to the over-expansive concentration of power in the British Parliament.
78
 
In examining Wilson’s philosophy, it is easy to view his political thought 
as something of an enigma.  Although his philosophical framework revolved 
around his vision of popular sovereignty and he was widely regarded as one of 
the most democratic prominent thinkers of his age, Wilson is said to have 
supported outwardly counter-majoritarian ideas in framing the  Constitution, 
particularly those pertaining to separation of powers.
79
  Madison’s notes of 
the Convention reveal, for instance, that Wilson was eager to place extensive 
checks on the popularly elected House of Representatives, even more so than 
the Constitution prescribed, as shown by his proposal for an absolute 




75  See generally, MADISON, supra note 26 (highlighting Wilson’s contributions at the Constitutional 
Convention); 1 JAMES WILSON, James Wilson’s State House Yard Speech October 6, 1787, in 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 171, 171–76 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 
2007) (highlighting Wilson’s contributions at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention). 
 76 1 JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British 
Parliament (1774), in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 3, 5.  Mark Hall 
notes that, in 1776, Wilson was a stern critic of Pennsylvania’s new constitution, in large part, because 
of its “abolition of separated powers” the document afforded most of the power to a unicameral 
legislature.  HALL, supra note 10, at 15. 
 77 1 WILSON, supra note 76. 
 78 See id. (questioning the “supreme, irresistible, uncontrolled authority” that Great Britain possessed). 
 79 See HALL, supra note 76, at 146 (noting that Wilson viewed judicial review as “temporary 
injunctions” rather than as a serious avenue to “thwart the majority”). 
 80 See MADISON, supra note 26, at 61.  Wilson thought that “[t]he Executive ought to have an absolute 
negative.  Without such a self-defense the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence.” 
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From the independence debate to the ratification debate, many of 
Wilson’s contemporaries attacked him on the public stage as an aristocrat.  In 
1776, for example, he was ousted from office after opposing the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.
81
  Although it was intended to be very democratic in form, 
Wilson objected to the Pennsylvania Constitution, in large part, because 
power had been too concentrated in a single body, affording almost all of the 
power to a unicameral legislature.
82
  The governing document, in essence, 
failed to conform with the separation of powers principle.  Despite the attacks 
from his political adversaries, Wilson’s democratic principles were 
fundamental to his political thought.  At the Convention, for instance, he had 
advocated for the direct election of the executive and both houses of Congress 
to the great disapproval of most of the delegates.
83
  Overall, Wilson placed 
great faith and confidence in the will of the majority, more so than arguably 
any of his Federalist allies. 
For Wilson, the proper objective of government is “to secure and to 
enlarge the exercise of  the natural rights of its members.”
84
  One that fails to 
designate this effort as its number one priority “is not a government of the 
legitimate kind.”
85
  Natural rights form the fundamental basis of  Wilson’s 
political thought.
86
  According to Wilson, natural rights derive from natural 
law, which  is prescribed by “our Creator.”
87
  The “will of God” is thus the 
origin of moral obligation and the  “only . . . source of superiority and 
obligation.”
88
  As subordinates to God, “we are under the most  perfect 
obligation to obey that law.”
89
  It follows that the natural law is “universal” 
and  “immutable.”
90
  Wilson describes these “eternal” truths, passed down by 
God, as “our constitution,” being supreme to all other sources of law.
91
  
Therefore, human law, including the United States Constitution, must yield to 
the natural law when they conflict according to Wilson.  In other words, if a 
 
 81 HALL, supra note 76, at 131.  
 82 Id. at 130.  
 83 See MADISON, supra note 26, at 41 (reasoning that this would help ensure that the branches would 
remain “independent as possible of each other”). 
 84 2 JAMES WILSON, Of Crimes Against the Rights of Individuals Acquired Under Civil Government, 
in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 1060, 1061. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra 
note 75, at 500 (discussing Wilson’s observations on the natural law). 
 87 Id. at 501. 
 88 Id. at 501, 508. 
 89 Id. at 500. 
 90 Id. at 523 (explaining that natural law, although immutable, may progress as the morals develop over 
time). 
 91 See id. (arguing that the natural law is universal and cannot be diminished, altered, or abolished). 
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law violates a guarantee of natural law, then it is not valid.  Wilson believed 
that the code of law passed down by mankind served as a means of conforming 
to the law passed down by Providence. 
In light of this, Wilson’s democratic principles were not the end 
themselves.  Rather, it was the means for preserving supreme natural rights 
and realizing the virtue that it prescribes.
92
  Or, as Wilson put it, the objective 
is a simple command: “Let man pursue his own perfection and happiness.”
93
  
Naturally, democracy is the best fit for this end.  A restrained government will, 
of course, better enable individuals to seek these successfully and without 
interference.  Wilson’s historical and comparative analysis of governments 
throughout the world demonstrate that other forms of government are more 
prone to descending into tyranny to the detriment of God’s will.
94
 
In his Lectures, Wilson explained that our moral perception is the guide 
for discerning and implementing the natural law.
95
  He placed a significant 
degree of trust in this faculty, referring to our notion of right and wrong as 
“intuitively discerned.”
96
  The exercise of morality necessary for satisfying 
God’s will does not require a formal education and most moral truths do not 
require reasoning, as they are self-evident.
97
  Wilson recognized that 
individuals’ moral sense is “diffused through every part of life” and begins to 
unfold “in the first stages of life.”
98
  His faith in the people’s conscience 
accounts for his constant adherence to the notion of popular sovereignty. 
When majority rule prevails, natural law will not be contradicted because 
the moral sense of the majority will be on the side of liberty.
99
  Therefore, the 
more representative the government is of the majority of the population, the 
more legitimate it will be.
100
  But Wilson acknowledged that this  is not always 
 
 92 See HALL, supra note 76, at 146 (“Wilson advocated democratic institutions because he thought they 
were most likely to legislate in accordance with natural law.”). 
 93 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 
75, at 503. 
 94 1 JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 
689, 690. 
 95 See 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra 
note 75, at 500, 509 (“We have the same reason to rely on the dictates of [moral perception], as upon 
the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural powers.”). 
 96 Id. at 512. 
 97 See id. at 513 (noting that the “cases that require reasoning are few”). 
 98 Id. at 510–11. 
 99 See Ralph Rossum, James Wilson and the “Pyramid of Government:” The Federal Republic, 6 
POL. SCI. REVIEWER 113, 135 (1976) (emphasizing the importance of consent for Wilson’s political 
philosophy). 
 100 See id. (“[Wilson] did not fear political power as long as it was in the hands of men to whom the 
people had given their consent.”). 
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the case and “there may be mistakes,” resulting in human laws that conflict 
with natural  law.
101
  Indeed, “[a]n indigested and inaccurate code of laws is one 
of the most dangerous things  that can be introduced into any government.”
102
  
This exception to Wilson’s primary thought  arguably accounts for instances 
of his seemingly counter-majoritarian proposals.  Sometimes, though rarely, 
majority rule does not comport with natural law, the ultimate end of 
government. 
While some of Wilson’s proposals regarding the separation of powers are 
seemingly contrary to his principle of popular sovereignty and are arguably 
inconsistent in that regard, the premise of Wilson’s interpretation of 
Montesquieu’s notion is that it furthers the natural law, thereby maintaining 
consistency with the Constitution’s forefront objective.  At the Constitutional 
Convention, Wilson remarked that “[t]he separation of the departments does 
not require that they should have separate objects but that they should act 
separately tho’ on the same objects.”
103
  In the Lectures, he suggests that 
independence means that the proceedings of each branch are not interfered 
with, but their actions are subject to control once they are complete.
104
  This 
suggests that his conception of the principle is similar to that of The Federalist 
in theory.  He believed that a significant degree of tension between the 
executive, legislative, and judiciary powers was necessary to a certain extent.  
However, his preferred application exhibits stark contrasts to what was 
implemented in the final product, even in some cases resembling 
Antifederalist preferences.  Wilson’s proposals and stances regarding 
legislative-revisionary power, the absolute veto, and the powers of the Senate 
highlight the differences in his political thought with those of both sides of the 
debate. 
 
 101 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 
75, at 500, 510. 
 102 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the 
Constitution of the United States, 1787, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 
75, at 178, 205. 
 103 MADISON, supra note 26, at 299.  Assuming that Madison’s records of the Convention are accurate 
(there has been considerable debate on this), Madison’s notes are arguably a stronger source of 
authority on Wilson’s preferences for government than his famous State House Yard Speech shortly 
after the Convention had adjourned.  Similar to The Federalist, which does not entirely reflect the 
views of Hamilton and Madison, Wilson’s speech was a pitch for a document that he personally did 
not agree with in its entirety (with respect to the ideas he proposed at the Convention).  However, 
Wilson did make certain concessions to the Antifederalist faction in the address. 
 104 1 JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 
689, 707. 
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Overall, Wilson was the most outspoken democrat at the Convention, 
advocating for the popular election of both houses of Congress and the 
President.
105
  In doing so, “he wished that vigorous authority . . . flow 
immediately from the legitimate source of all authority,” “the mind or sense 
of the people at large.”
106
  Yet, some of his proposals for delegating powers 
among the three branches of the Constitution were seen as contrary to the 
whim of the majority.  For instance, at the Convention, Wilson suggested that 
the executive and judiciary branches both ought to have “[r]evisionary power” 
for all legislation passed by Congress.
107
  In essence, this meant that Wilson 
wanted to go beyond the notion of judicial review subscribed in Hamilton’s 
Federalist No. 78, thereby connecting the branches to a greater degree.  Many 
delegates thought that the mixture was a step too far, fearing that it would 
establish “an improper coalition between the Executive [and] Judiciary 
departments.”
108
  Indeed, many delegates felt that judges ought to be “free from 
the bias of having participated in [the law’s] formation.”
109
  But Wilson believed 
that when laws, even those approved by the majority, are unjust or destructive 
(or, in other words, violate natural law), the unelected judges ought to be able 
to employ their wisdom to counteract them, even before the law is enacted 
and executed.
110
  With regard to the question of law-making then, Wilson 
urged that the branches be less separate and distinct from one another than 
Antifederalists and most Federalists  had deemed appropriate. 
Wilson employed the same justification for his proposal for an absolute 
executive veto.  While the Convention ultimately agreed to grant the President 
a partial negative that can be overturned by Congress, Wilson wanted to give 
the President the final word.
111
  He warned that without this check, the three 
branches could not remain distinct and independent, as “the  Legislature 
[could] at any moment sink [the executive] into non-existence.”
112
  According 
to the notes, he was even willing to go as far as giving both the executive and 
 
 105 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Federal Convention, 1787, in COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 80, 82, 85. 
 106 Id. at 90.  Wilson believed that, despite different modes of choosing judges, representatives, and the 
President, all official authority derives from the same source: the people.  In that sense then, even 
though federal judges are unelected, judicial interference in law-making is not contrary to majority 
rule under Wilson’s framework. 
 107 Id. at 121. 
 108 Id. at 296. 
 109 Id. at 51. 
 110 See id. at 121–22 (providing Wilson’s argument for judicial revisionary power). 
 111 Id. at 88. 
 112 Id. 
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judiciary departments a  joint absolute negative.
113
  But Wilson believed that 
the negative would rarely be used because Congress would almost always 
refrain from passing laws that endanger liberty.
114
  However, the check was 
nevertheless necessary to counter those rare instances.
115
  Although Wilson felt 
that this would help ensure that the branches remain truly separate, he 
preferred the powers to intermingle  more than prescribed in the Federalist 
and desired by most Antifederalists.  At the Convention, delegates felt that an 
absolute veto would give the President too much authority over the Legislature 
and ultimately rejected Wilson’s proposal.
116
  Given Antifederalist criticism to 
the limited veto,
117
 it can be inferred that most Antifederalists would object to 
one individual being able to negate the whim of two legislative bodies without 
recourse.  In his fourth essay, for instance, the Impartial Examiner argued that 
even the qualified negative was excessive because it afforded the President “a 
weight [on the legislative scale of government] almost equal to that of two 
thirds of the whole Congress.”
118
  This reasoning implies that an executive with 




However, for certain elements of governance, Wilson’s preferred 
application of separation of powers was more on par with that of the 
Antifederalists.  As elaborated above, the opponents of the Constitution were 
especially critical of the powers afforded to the Senate, insisting that the body 
would be prone to abuses of power under the constitutional framework.  To 
an extent, Wilson agreed with them and he expressed concern about the 
 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id.  This stance epitomizes Wilson’s primary political philosophy regarding the ends and means 
of government, as explained by Mark Hall: In short, according to his Lectures, the end of government 
is the preservation of and adherence to natural law while the means of achieving that is democratic 
governance.  HALL, supra note 10, at 146–47.  While the democratic majority will almost always 
conform to this end, Wilson recognized that there are sometimes extenuating circumstances that 
require this absolute negative veto.  Id. 
 116 See MADISON, supra note 26, at 52 (warning by Benjamin Franklin that, in Pennsylvania, “the 
[absolute] negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money”); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the advantages of a qualified negative over an 
absolute one). 
 117 See 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the 
Constitution of the United States, 1787, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, 
at 178, 230 (responding to the critique that the presidential veto afforded legislative power to the 
executive and therefore violated separation of powers). 
 118 The Impartial Examiner IV, VA. INDEP. CHRON. (June 11, 1788), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 2 (John P. Kaminski, 
Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber & Margaret A. Hogan eds., 2009) 
 119 Id. 
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Senate on multiple occasions.  At the Convention, Gouverneur Morris argued 
that it was wrong for the Senate to try judges for wrongdoing while filling the 
vacancies that they created by removing them from the bench.
120
  Madison 
noted that Wilson was of the same opinion for the same reasons.
121
  But, in 
December 1787, Wilson was charged with defending the proposed 
Constitution at the Pennsylvania Convention. He conceded, however, the 
validity of the critique “that the powers of the several parts of [the] government 
are not kept as distinct and independent as they ought to be.”
122
  Namely, he 
stated that the powers of the Senate are not as separate as he  would have 
hoped.
123
  Indeed, he pointed out that, in this governmental framework, “the 
distinction and independence of power is not adhered to with entire 
theoretical precision.”
124
  While Wilson  did not explicitly say which powers 
he personally disagreed with, it can be reasonably inferred that the 
combination of appointments and removal from office was one on his mind 
given his concurrence with Morris.  In the same address, he also discussed the 
treaty power, which he referred to as “a blending of the legislative and 
executive powers in the senate.”
125
  Wilson noticed the favorable and 
unfavorable side of the power, but raised the question of whether “the 
objectionable parts are of a sufficient weight to induce a rejection of this 
constitution.”
126
  These remarks suggest that Wilson acknowledged the 
objections to the blending because, to an extent, it concerned him as well.  
Thus, while Wilson sympathized and likely agreed with certain aspects of 
the  Antifederalist position on separation of powers, he emphasized that the 
Constitution’s distribution  of power was an improvement over the Articles of 
Confederation—which afforded nearly all federal power to a unicameral 
legislature—and all of the state constitutions at the time.
127
  Despite the notable 
defects of the Constitution, Wilson urged even the most strenuous objectors 
 
 120 MADISON, supra note 26, at 517. 
 121 Id. 
 122 James Wilson’s Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 842. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 844. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. at 842–43 (surveying the defects of various state constitutions in this regard); see also 1 JAMES 
WILSON, James Wilson’s State House Yard Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 171, 176 (stating that “any thing nearer to perfection could not 
have been accomplished”). 
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to keep an open mind: “Let the experiment be made; let the system be fairly 




During the ratification debate, varying applications of Montesquieu’s 
maxim were proposed.  Significant differences in the principle existed 
between advocates and opponents of the Constitution and within the factions 
as well.  The Antifederalists generally argued for a stricter reading of 
separation of powers, maintaining that the branches ought to be as distinct and 
separate as possible, to the extent that it can be reconciled with a durable 
government.  Proponents of the Constitution differed with the Antifederalists’ 
sense of practicality.  Some Federalists such as Wilson, however, disagreed 
with numerous aspects of the final compromise.  Differences in philosophical 
outlook account for these differences.  Wilson’s concept of a national 
sovereign people was appropriated by Publius and the Federalists as a 
springboard for abandoning the Articles of Confederation.  However, Gordon 
Wood has argued that the Federalist attachment to popular sovereignty was 
disingenuous, “exploit[ing] the language that more rightfully belonged to  their 
opponents.”
129
  Wilson, however, as a general matter, was more sincere.  The 
Federalist expresses degrees of distrust in the people at large that Wilson’s 
philosophy lacks.
130
  In light of this, it makes  sense that Wilson did not share 
the same degree of fondness towards the mixing of Senate and  executive 
powers as did Publius.
131
  He wanted more checks on the legislature, but he 
was much  warmer to the powers of the judiciary, advocating for broader 
authority than the Constitution  afforded to the third branch.
132
  A maverick of 
political thought, Wilson was a devout nationalist, yet his general trust of 
majority will more closely resembled Antifederalist thought.  As applied 
to separation of powers, his positions at both the Federal and Pennsylvania 
 
 128 James Wilson’s Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 838. 
 129 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 562 (1998). 
 130 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the dangers of an “overbearing 
majority”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“[T]here is a degree 
of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust . . . .”). 
 131 See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 J. CONST. L. 901, 976 
(2008) (explaining that “[Wilson’s] trust in the good sense of the people was not matched by an equal 
trust in their elected representatives”); see also id. at 978 (pointing out that Wilson’s priority was the 
representation of individuals while Madison’s priority was the representation of interests). 
132  See, e.g., 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Federal Convention (1787), in 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 80, 121 (advocating for a revisionary 
power for the Judiciary). 
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conventions ranged across the span of the debate, many surpassing the checks 
put into effect by the Constitution and some approaching the degree of 
separation preferred by his opposition.
133
  In essence, while Wilson’s 
democratic priorities were arguably more in line with those of the 
Antifederalists, his methods of achieving them led him to the Federalist cause.  
His positions, in relation to those of his contemporaries, reveal complexities 
in the principle of separation of powers.  His ultimate goals for the new 
government differed from those of Madison and Hamilton in numerous ways, 
but his way of implementing them were largely in harmony with the Federalist 
ideology. 
 
133  See id. at 88 (proposing an absolute executive veto).  But see James Wilson’s Summation and Final 
Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 842 
(explaining that the Senate is not as separate as Wilson would have liked it to be as designed). 
